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Abstract : The recent widespread deployment of 
wireless LAN technology raises the question of how 
a mobile telephony system might instead be 
architected to use wireless LAN access points  and 
the Internet to achieve similar services. In this 
paper, we examine an end-to-end architecture for 
mobile telephony, with a strong  focus on endpoint 
issues. 
We have designed, implemented, and have 
experience using devices we call Internet Mobile 
Phones or IMPs. The IMP system provides 
encrypted wireless voice communication over 
802.11B LANs.  IMPs run Linux on a lightweight 
single-board computer running customized voice 
over IP software; data is encrypted with 128-bit 
Blowfish.  
The paper reports on our design decisions and the 
resulting implementation of the IMPs, with 
sufficient detail to reproduce the devices. We report 
our experiences with using them for several months 
in a laboratory environment, and close with 
proposals for future experiments to investigate scale 
and extensibility. 
1. Introduction 
The increasing ubiquity of Internet communication 
and wireless access points has made universal Internet 
access increasingly convenient. There are clearly 
barriers to this vision of accessing a device by its 
address such as NAT boxes, firewalls and for-pay 
services, but social factors and technologies such as 
IPv6 favor its long-term growth. A potentially 
important consequence of this infrastructure is the 
ability to utilize the Internet for new applications, some 
of which are enabled simply by the availability of new 
edge devices [6] and the addition of some software 
“glue” to achieve interoperability with the existing 
Internet infrastructure.  
The cellular telephone system provides widespread 
wireless voice service, and is integrated with the 
traditional telephony system. This enjoys excellent  
“network externalities”, as the first deployed cellular 
telephone is part of a network with extensive 
connectivity. Cellular telephones are now evolving 
towards computers, but the basic bearer architecture 
has remained one of telephony. Table I illustrates the 
design choices for infrastructures for mobile telephony, 
with access and bearer architectures on one axis and 
some common devices on the other. The traditional 
mobile phone system uses circuit-switched access and a 
circuit-switched bearer architecture. While provision of 
VOIP bearer services is underway in the telephony 
industry, and portions of it such as SS7 or SCTP 
signaling are packet-switched, deployed mobile 
telephony access infrastructure is circuit-switched. 
3GPP and 3GPP2  phones resemble Internet terminals, 
but use a managed guaranteed bandwidth network.  
Table I: Switching and Roles in Voice Services 
 
One timely question is whether the growing Internet 
infrastructure is well-suited to providing a mobile 
telephony service, now that wireless access through 
802.11b LANS is increasingly common, and often 
publicly accessible. 
        While a widespread IP telephony infrastructure 
is now being developed and deployed with various 
Voice Over IP (VOIP) protocols, reproducing various 
features of handheld wireless voice devices intended to 
behave as mobile telephones presented an interesting 
design exercise. In addition, since features are added at 
the endpoints in the IP architecture, design choices 
existed for privacy protections unavailable to the 
traditional cellular telephone user. These protections 
are particularly attractive in the context of wireless 
VOIP services. 
 
1.1. Experimental Goals 
 
Our hypothesis was that a handheld mobile 802.11 
device using IP as a bearer service would provide 
indications that an alternative architecture for mobile 
telephony was possible if not today, then in the very 
near future. Our experimental methodology was the 
implementation of a system, largely centered around 
the design of the endpoint (as the end-to-end argument 
[21] would suggest is the appropriate design objective) 
we call the Internet Mobile Phone, or IMP. An 
operational IMP which emulates circuit-based 
telephony over wireless access to IP presents an 
objective demonstration of the strength of a purely-IP 
based mobile telephony approach. 
Our high level design goals for the IMP were as 
follows: 
1. Design and implement a user device which would 
serve as a portable personal 802.11b client. 
2. Implement a fully capable IP host on the device, 
that given an IP address would be able to interact 
with any other, including another such device 
3. Provide a simple Voice Over IP (VOIP) service 
Device 
Type 
Mobile Access 
Infrastructure 
Bearer 
Service 
Infrastructure 
Cellular 
Telephone 
Wireless 
Circuit-
Switched 
Circuit-
Switched 
(VOIP core?) 
Internet 
Mobile Phone 
(IMP) 
Wireless 
Packet-Switched 
IP 
IP packet 
switched 
4. Provide as much of the ad-hoc, unregulated “feel” 
of a walkie-talkie  as possible, while providing a 
reasonable mobile telephony service 
5. Provide a secure channel establishment protocol 
and encryption of the data on the VOIP channel 
for privacy protection. 
 
1.2. Outline of this paper 
 
This paper is not about the number of such devices 
that can be supported by an 802.11b access point, nor 
is it about the quality of service required [1] or voice 
quality achievable. It is not about audio for desktop use 
on a LAN [23,24,25]. Instead,  we  sought to prototype 
a working secure IP mobile telephony system that met 
our high level goals, and was realizable at a reasonable 
cost in both time and money. We believe we have 
achieved that, as we used the devices to communicate 
at what, by virtue of our many conversations we judge 
to be reasonable voice quality, at least as good as the 
commercial cellular telephones we use. As an aside, 
since some of the conversations were about the system, 
it might be argued that it helped bootstrap itself into 
existence. 
 The next section, Section 2, provides a more 
detailed discussion of the design goals for an IMP. 
Section 3 describes the hardware realization of our 
handset, including a parts list for those interested in 
reproducing our experiment (one of our long-term 
research goals is to build a user community to test 
scalability issues – see Section 8). Section 4 discusses 
the software environment, which required substantial 
engineering of device support software and integration 
of encryption and VOIP. Section 5 describes the 
implementation and evaluation of the security features 
of our system. Section 6 describes our experience 
using the system. Section 7 concludes the paper with 
our assessments of the contributions of this work and 
desirable directions for follow-on work. 
 
2. Detailed Design Goals 
 
An Internet Mobile Phone is a mobile voice 
communication device that uses the increasingly 
prevalent wireless LAN access to IP. An IMP 
experimental prototype must address the following 
design issues: 
• IP based wireless networking 
• Security Architecture and Authentication 
• Voice Communication System 
• Device Operating Environment 
• Hardware and packaging 
 
IP based networking is a central design goal as it 
allows us to address the larger hypothesis of the paper, 
that wireless LAN technology provides a natural 
transition from circuit-centric to IP-centric mobile 
telephony.  The 802.11b wireless LAN is widely 
deployed, and IP addresses are obtained at wireless 
LAN access points that interface to the broader 
Internet, typically via DHCP.  IP transport can be used 
for both the control and data planes of the system. 
Security criteria can be modeled as CIA – 
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability. Any 
broadcast network can be disrupted by transmission-
based attacks (such as jamming or flooding) which 
would inhibit availability. Thus we did not make 
availability a security goal, but did set confidentiality 
and integrity as major goals. The use of cryptography 
seemed obvious; the question is at where in the design 
it would be employed. In brief, we chose an end-to-end 
strategy and encrypted voice before transporting it via 
conventional IP. Some privacy goals (such as 
knowledge of who is talking to whom) are sacrificed in 
the service of sensible layering, although use of an IP-
based service allows one to employ very sophisticated 
schemes (such as those based on IPsec tunnels [28] or 
onion routing) if so required. 
The IMP establishes logically peer-to-peer 
connections to transmit voice data.  Since dynamic IP 
addressing is used, and IP communication between 
peers requires at a minimum reciprocal knowledge of 
addresses, we maintain a list of the IP addresses of all 
connected users. When a user logs on to the system the 
authentication system will store the IP address assigned 
to the user and allow the user to retrieve IP address of 
other connected users. This has the flavor of a “buddy 
list” or simply an on-line directory. A variety of other 
schemes are possible under various assumptions about 
how addresses are managed, such as per-device static 
IP addresses; beaconing with ring search for IP address 
discovery using fast broadcast [7]; or the “home 
address” concepts used in Mobile IP [11]. These issues 
are not central to the architectural question and while 
technically fascinating are beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
There are a variety of Voice Over IP (VOIP) 
platforms. One such platform, the Nautilus [4] open 
source system includes encryption, provides a good 
basis for securing a peer-to-peer voice channel, using 
Diffie-Hellman [3] key exchange for each 
conversational session. We note in passing that Diffie-
Hellman key exchange requires no external method of 
key management.   
Easy implementation of the prototype suggested a 
general purpose computing platform with a familiar 
programming environment, especially as much of the 
work required in integrating the components of the 
system would be done in software. The wide range of 
devices supported by Linux, the availability of the 
Nautilus system, and a variety of embedded versions 
appropriate for single-board computer (SBC) 
implementation motivated our choice. Among other 
tasks to be detailed in Section 4, the software manages 
the bootstrap, authentication/contact lists, user 
interface, call setup and teardown, networking, the 
voice codec and encryption. 
Our hardware design goals were first to use as many 
off-the-shelf components as possible, and to compose 
them to both ease prototyping and to meet the 
packaging constraints of a system intended for 
handheld mobile use. While a secondary goal, we also 
sought to be reasonably cost-effective in our choices. 
This suggested, for example, that we choose a design 
which could accommodate 802.11 hardware readily 
found in our laboratory, such as PC-MCIA 
implementations, and this influenced our choice of 
SBC. As discussed in the next section, an IMP can be 
realized for under $1000 by a capable hobbyist. 
 
3. Hardware Design and Realization 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Top View of the IMP 
 
 
The hardware is small enough for handheld 
operation.  We used a small, battery-powered single 
board computer (SBC) based on the StrongArm used in 
many mobile telephones, the Elf [10]. We operated the 
Elf at 133 Mhz, although the system’s data sheet 
indicated operation up to 206 Mhz. The processor is 
 
Table 2 : Components used and costs  
 
capable of 150 Dhrystone MIPS at the 133 Mhz clock 
rate. The Elf requires battery power in the range of 6.0 
volts (drawing 1.5 Amps) to 12.0 V (drawing 1.0 
Amp).  A pack of eight AA Nickel-Metal Hydride 
rechargeable batteries was used.  These batteries 
provide 1.2 V each, for a total of 9.6 V.  Each battery 
has 1700 milliamp hours (mAh) of power, and though 
the draw varies with use, experience showed that this 
eight-battery configuration normally lasts over two and 
a half hours while the phone is being used 
continuously, and a longer lifetime if the IMP is idle. 
We have made no serious attempts in our prototype to 
address power management, but as with packaging, the 
problem can be addressed ; see e.g., [8]. An LCD 
display [14] is used for output, a keypad for input.  The 
LCD display and keypad communicate with the Elf 
through an RS-232 serial cable.  
 
 
 
Figure 2 : Bottom View of the IMP 
 
The SBC is coupled to commercial PC-MCIA 
802.11b devices. The channel bandwidth must be great 
enough to transmit voice data.  The most compact 
encoding scheme that may be ? se dis LPC-10, which 
requires 14.4 kbps plus some overhead.  The data rate 
must be greater than approximately 15kbps.  IEEE 
802.11b supports much higher data rates (11 Mbps) so 
this is not an issue. Throughput tests using ttcp 
between the Elf and a more powerful computer indicate 
that the IP/802.11 system can obtain more than 
adequate throughputs of 500 kilobytes per second. The 
use of commercial off-the-shelf devices means that any 
commercial 802.11b access point can be used as 
infrastructure for the device. Parts are detailed in Table 
2. 
 
Using these components, the total cost of 
implementation is well under $1000, in reach of many 
hobbyists (we purchased one of the Elfs as part of a 
development kit costing about $3000, but the 
additional $2400 for the development software we 
consider a one-time cost, as others can use our GPLed 
Item Manufacturer Cost 
Elf SBC Inhand Electronics $640 
Keypad Digikey $15 
LCD display Matrix Orbital $85 
802.11bPCMCIA Orinoco $90 
Plexiglas Case Machine Shop $120 
8 AA Ni-MH 
Battery 
Energizer $24 
source). As the device was intended for mobile use, the 
individual parts were packaged into a portable unit, as 
photographed in Figures 1 and 2.  
Two Plexiglas panels house the components.  The 
bottom panel (Figure 2) holds the SBC and the battery 
pack (which can be seen at the bottom of the 
photograph), while the top panel (as can be seen in 
Figure 1) holds the LCD, keypad, and 
microphone/speaker jacks.  The overall size is 8.5” 
long x 4” wide x 3.5” high – the size can be inferred 
from the familiar AA batteries or 802.11 card. The 
Plexiglas frame was milled by a local machine shop.  
The SBC is located on the bottom Plexiglas panel, 
as can be seen in Figure 2. A specialized 
implementation of the Linux operating system runs on 
the SBC, which manages the user interface and secure 
voice over IP software. The software architecture is 
described below in Section 4. To ease implementation 
the database is run remotely on a server, as we describe 
in Section 5. 
The system has proven to be quite reliable, in spite 
of stress-testing from laboratory clumsiness and 
transport in backpacks and coat pockets. 
 
4. Software Design and Realization 
 
Software systems comprised the majority of the 
effort in prototyping the Internet Mobile Phone.  The 
effort was split up into the encryption software, the 
voice over IP software, the authentication software, and 
the phone operating software.  The encryption and 
voice over IP software were based on the Nautilus open 
source software.  In addition, the software also 
supports the following features: 
• Full Duplex Audio (for good interactive use) 
• User Modifiable Database 
• Secure Voice over IP 
• LCD and Keypad Interface 
• Stateless Client Device 
The basic flow of the device software is 
straightforward. It initializes the device (essentially a 
bootstrap) when the device is powered up, and then 
waits for a user login. Data is sent to the server to 
authenticate for local access. A contact list of IP 
addresses is retrieved and the system is then ready to 
send or receive voice calls. In either the caller or callee 
mode, Diffie-Hellman key negotiation is used to 
generate a session key used to encrypt the voice 
conversation. Call termination results in the system 
returning to the “prepared for call” state.  
 
4.1. Operating System 
 
Linux has been ported [13] to run on the Elf’s 
StrongARM processor, and drivers have been written 
for much of the common hardware that populates the 
embedded boards that have these processors.  As 
mentioned before, the Elf SBC is constructed on the 
Intel StrongArm processor platform. Our development 
environment, however, operates on Intel x86 processor 
platforms, so cross-compilation was required.  We 
incrementally built a language development 
environment for the Elf and then moved other software 
as required. 
We use the Boot Loader OBject (BLOB) boot loader 
to load and start the operating system.  We had to 
modify BLOB to run on the Elf, mainly modifying 
addresses at which memory was located as well as sizes 
for this memory. This included SDRAM chips to 
initialize the Elf RAM, as well as onboard Flash in 
which the kernel and embedded filesystem are stored. 
To ease operation, we configured the serial hardware 
on the Elf so that a remote terminal could connect to 
BLOB, through which commands could be entered via 
a text console. These changes allow BLOB to locate 
and run the Linux operating system. 
 
4.2. Device Support 
 
The Elf has a Phillips UCB1200 audio codec [17] on 
its board. To use this hardware to record and play audio 
the Linux driver source code was modified, mainly to 
choose appropriate initialization parameters such as 
IRQ and I/O ports, but also to issue commands directly 
to the codec hardware to correctly initialize the 
hardware buffers. 
The Elf also includes an embedded PCMCIA 
controller chip on the board. The StrongArm SA1100 
processor chipset provides a method to connect each of 
the PCMCIA card sockets on the PCMCIA controller 
directly to separate locations in DRAM, and grant 
access to the controller chip directly by writing to 
standard memory locations.  Unfortunately, the Elf 
does not use this method of interacting with its 
PCMCIA chip. Rather, it is manufactured with both of 
the PCMCIA card sockets mapped to the first DRAM 
address, instead of separating the sockets to different 
DRAM locations.  In addition to this alteration, the 
Cirrus chipset is only supported by the Linux kernel 
when it resides on an ISA or PCI bus.  Due to the 
attachment of the controller chip directly to DRAM, it 
was necessary to change the driver to directly access 
the controller chip registers through memory.  The 
changes to facilitate this were provided for an earlier 
version of Linux, and they were fixed to work on the 
most current versions of the Linux kernel. We also had 
to virtualize addresses for memory mapped I/O. Once 
the PCMCIA cards themselves were accessible, the 
Linux PCMCIA driver table was configured to access 
the cards.  
A modified Linux was needed to provide the 
software platform on which the SVOIP program as 
well as the user interface could run.  The Elf has 16 
MB of DRAM available, which after system startup 
leaves between 5 and 8 MB for user programs.  The 
base of any version of Linux is the combination of 
libraries that are provided. The programs that were run 
on the Elf were queried for their library needs, and a 
minimal list of libraries compiled.  These libraries were 
then stripped of all debugging support and extra data.   
To run user commands and provide the basic system 
commands, Busybox was used.  Busybox is an 
embedded program that provides all of the 
functionality of the standard Linux system commands 
in one monolithic program.  Busybox is configurable to 
include only minimal necessary functions and 
programs. The final packages that were added to Linux 
were the serial line file transfer package, lrzsz, and the 
standard Linux PCMCIA packages that provide 
programs to control the drivers and cards.   
The base filesystem was populated with these 
libraries and programs, and it occupied 6 MB. 
Unfortunately, the maximum allowable size is 4 MB.  
As there are two available PCMCIA slots, the second 
slot was used for a 64MB flash card with an IDE hard 
drive interface. To reduce the space used, the programs 
that are needed to mount an IDE disk card were 
queried for their libraries, and all but those few 
libraries were moved to the IDE disk.  Symbolic links 
were used to point from the standard library locations 
to the new locations on the IDE disk.  These links are 
“dangling” until the IDE disk is mounted, but none of 
the programs that use those libraries are run until the 
disk is mounted, ensuring reachability when needed.  
This trick reduced the base filesystem size to 2.5 MB. 
All code patches were submitted back to the 
package authors for inclusion into the main code base. 
In the case of the audio driver, it was accepted into the 
main Linux kernel.  This allows anyone with an Elf to 
download the Linux kernel and use the audio hardware.  
Patches have also been made available to the Elf Linux 
support group. The drivers are in use by this group, and 
are also being used to start the official Linux support 
from the Elf’s manufacturer. 
 
4.3. Voice over IP Architecture 
 
The intentionally simplistic voice over IP software 
subsystem is comprised of two parts: 
1. Voice encoding/decoding 
2. Transport layer protocol 
As discussed in the previous subsection, the Elf 
SBC includes the Phillips UCB 1200 single chip 
integrated mixed signal audio and telecom codec.  The 
UCB 1200 allows for programmable sampling rates, so 
the sampling is set by the voice encoding software. The 
voice encoding software controls audio sampling and 
encoding. The software records samples from the audio 
hardware and encodes the voice using an existing voice 
codec. The voice codec digitizes analog voice data 
from the microphone into a readily transportable form. 
The voice encoding software is also responsible for 
reversing these steps at the receiving device. 
Once the voice is encoded into binary form and 
encrypted with the encryption software, the data must 
be packaged and sent to the receiving party.  The voice 
over IP software uses two Internet data channels to 
conduct the conversation. TCP is used for a reliable 
control plane and UDP is used for voice packets under 
the assumption that humans can interpolate data losses.   
The voice samples were 16bits, and would ideally be 
taken in 320 byte frames at 8Khz. As the codec limited 
sample frames to powers of 2, we used 512 byte 
frames.  
While the base Nautilus system had many desirable 
features, the audio hardware control and Internet data 
transport mechanisms are not appropriate.  The 
software does not allow full duplex audio, essential for 
voice conversation.  The data transport protocol is 
proprietary, and built on UDP/IP.  This appeared 
unnecessarily complex; we simplified it for engineering 
and performance reasons. 
The software is able to handle either an unencrypted 
or fully encrypted, full duplex voice conversation. 
When a call is received, the SVOIP software is 
initialized.  Parameters are exchanged to make sure 
both parties want the same level of encryption, to 
identify the port used, and to ensure compatibility of 
other session parameters.  If it is an encrypted call, the 
Diffie-Hellman protocol is used to negotiate a secret 
key for the duration of the call.  The software is then 
multithreaded using POSIX threads. This is called the 
audio loop. 
The audio loop encodes the voice data, sends the 
data, receives data, and decodes it.  This has been 
added to provide full duplex audio.  Full duplex audio 
is achieved by spawning three threads.  The first thread 
reads data from the microphone, encodes it, encrypts it, 
and sends it to the other device.  The second thread 
waits to receive data, decrypts it, decodes it, and plays 
it through the speaker.  The third thread is used for a 
control signal; once the call is ended, the program is 
exited and the user is returned to the user interface. 
The voice data is encoded and decoded using the 
G.711 µlaw codec.  This codec does not compress, and 
therefore provides the highest possible audio quality.  
The bit rate transmitted is about 25 kbps.  Wireless 
802.11b allows for up to 11 Mbps, and one antenna has 
a range of 150 to 200 feet.  Many more users could 
share an access point, even in this simplistic mode, 
which has the desirable properties of good quality and 
low delay. Some crude measurements indicate that the 
512 byte frames are encoded and encrypted in about 
40-45 ms. There is no noticeable difference in delay 
with the encryption on or off, suggesting that the 
delays in  the system are from buffer copying from the 
audio hardware into a user space buffer. 
The main control signal sent besides initial 
parameter exchange is that to end a call.  The third 
thread in the audio loop sits and waits for a “kill” 
signal.  When one party ends a call, it joins the threads, 
sends a “kill” signal through the TCP channel, and then 
closes all open file descriptors and sockets.  Similarly, 
once the other party receives this “kill” signal, the 
threads are joined and all open file descriptors and 
sockets are closed. 
 
5. Security Architecture and Evaluation 
 
As we discussed in Section 2, of the “CIA” criteria 
our design goals for the security architecture included 
confidentiality and integrity for voice conversations,  
but did not include availability. Our reasoning was that 
the spectrum management and multiplexing issues are 
addressable elsewhere in an IP-independent fashion, 
such as via spread-spectrum for the former concerns 
and via overprovisioning or QoS for the latter. 
 
5.1. Authentication 
 
Most IEEE 802.11b infrastructures use dynamic IP 
addresses obtained via DHCP. A directory service must 
exist for users to determine each other’s addresses for 
peer-to-peer connection.  As mentioned in Section 2, 
there are a variety of approaches to this problem, 
ranging from fixed IP addresses to broadcast discovery 
protocols such and an expanding ring search (this latter 
approach does have the attractive property that it is 
both “ad hoc” and “pure” peer-to-peer). The approach 
we took, largely to ease implementation within the 
context of our organization’s existing 802.11 
infrastructure, is to maintain a central store for all IP 
addresses, contact list information, and information 
about online users.  The database is kept on a server to 
allow access either through the device, or through a 
web interface. Such a database could also be 
maintained in a peer-to-peer fashion if desired.  A 
Secure Socket Layer (SSL)-based web interface [5] is 
used for account creation and contact list management. 
After a user has logged onto the system, the program 
executes a retrieve routine for the IP addresses.  This 
routine will then establish a session with the database 
to read and write data. In order to limit accessibility 
and address security concerns, the database will 
maintain its own authentication with client privileges.  
The device or user interface will then write the IP 
address to a master table and retrieve the contact list 
information from a table.  Upon completion of these 
two operations, the session to the database is closed.  
The database will only be accessed on a need basis and 
the device is required to establish a connection every 
time it tries to get information. This stateless 
transactional model reduces the both the amount of 
trusted state and the window of vulnerability. With 
transmission of password and data from the 
authentication system, encryption is needed to provide 
security and to maintain data integrity.  We used 
Apache with SSL for the server. SSL provides for 
secure communication between client and server by 
allowing mutual authentication, the use of digital 
signatures for integrity, and encryption for privacy. 
 
5.2. Peer-to-Peer Key Exchange 
 
Diffie-Hellman key negotiation [3] is used for the 
IMP. The resulting shared secret is used as a key for 
the Blowfish encryption algorithm discussed in the 
next section.  Keys are dynamically created for each 
conversation. There are no stored keys anywhere in the 
system. 
 
5.3. Voice Encryption 
 
The encryption software operates in two phases: key 
exchange and voice encryption. The Diffie-Hellman 
key negotiation protocol is used for key exchange for a 
voice session. Encryption of the voice data stream 
takes place immediately before transport and consists 
of enciphering the data with the negotiated key for the 
conversation.  
We used the Blowfish [23] cipher with a 128-bit key 
to encipher the voice data stream. Blowfish has two 
major advantage for an embedded device: (1) it is 
compact, running in less than 5 K of memory used; and 
(2) it uses only simple machine operations such as 
exclusive OR’s, additions, and table lookups.  These 
advantages are significant for a RISC embedded device 
such as the Elf with limited memory. An AES 
implementation might also be interesting. As 
conversation is interactive, performance gains pay off 
in a reduction of delays from encryption operations 
performed on the voice streams. 
Blowfish is a 64-bit block cipher.  The data to be 
encrypted is split into 64-bit blocks and encrypted by 
repeated passes through a simple function that is 
repeated sixteen times. In this it resembles the 
substitution and confusion schemes [24] used in DES 
[16] but as we have noted above, Blowfish is very 
sensitive to the concerns of embedded software 
implementation.   
 
5.4. Security Evaluation 
 
The security goals of the system were voice privacy 
and integrity.  Voice scrambling has a long history 
[12], some of this experience showing that voice 
scrambling is harder than it looks. While we believe 
that SSL and Blowfish are robust, we wished to 
validate the system in several ways to test our design 
and implementation, mainly looking for coding 
mistakes, e.g., to check that we were not sending 
cleartext packets or clear speech by accident.. 
We built a small 802.11b promiscuous listening 
system with which we could emulate an opponent’s 
presumed capabilities.  This program runs on a 
computer with an 802.11b card that can intercept IP 
packets on the same LAN. We dumped traces into a log 
while the system was operating. While MAC and IP 
addresses and UDP port numbers are visible and might 
aid traffic analysis, a variety of known techniques such 
as Onion Routing could be used to create a robust 
privacy overlay if one were required, so this did not 
concern us. Other classic attacks on such a system 
would include attacking the authentication phase of the 
security protocol. Our use of an SSL interface insulates 
against problems with the authentication service, and 
barring bugs in SSL, will be secure. After a visual (but 
not exhaustive) examination of the tcpdump-formatted 
log data we could find no useful data. 
To study the security of the system for voice 
privacy, a packet sniffer (and thus a “promiscuous 
listener” at several layers…) was implemented, and 
selected packets (those between the two devices using 
UDP, which we presumed were voice) were captured. 
The packet format is conventional, UDP encapsulated 
in IP and IP encapsulated in an Ethernet frame. The 
three headers (Ethernet, IP, and UDP) are stripped and 
then the UDP payload, where the voice data is found, is 
sent through the same functions to decode and play it 
as is done in the secure voice over IP software was 
played out through the speaker.  
In every experiment we performed the output of the 
sniffer was (loud) noise, which based on listening we 
believe reasonable to declare white noise. A complete 
study  would use an RF analyzer to detect signals and 
emissions from the device outside of the bands used by 
802.11b, and would apply various spectral tests to 
ensure that the encoded voice was indeed indiscernible 
from noise. While not trivial, the EM shielding 
problem is understood, and the IMP’s architecture is 
independent of the choice of cipher we rely on for 
voice encryption. Relative to the overall architectural 
goal of the system, it was remarkably easy to provide 
encrypted voice; it should be more common. 
 
6. Experiences 
 
As noted in Sections 1 and 7 we have not attempted 
to experiment with any scalability issues – that would 
be challenging indeed with the two IMPs we have 
actually constructed. However, that being said, we 
have considerable operational experience with these 
two systems, which have proven a great deal of fun to 
use when roaming around our organization’s campus, 
one well-equipped with 802.11b access points. 
The device’s software user interface has proven 
quite effective, if for no other reason than it resembles 
conventional voice equipment such as our mobile 
telephone design target (except, obviously as can be 
seen in Figures 1 and 2, for packaging). The main user 
interface program is a menu navigation system written 
in Python. This allowed the user interface to use secure 
HTTP connections, write to files, run system programs, 
manipulate strings, and create complex data structures 
with ease.  The code from the LCD library was used as 
an extension module to the Python library to give us 
access to the LCD functions from Python.  The user is 
presented with the basic menus of the system; contact 
list, call arbitrary IP address, and system menu.   
The contact list is a scrolling list of names of people 
that the user has specified that they are interested in 
talking to.  The contact list allows the user to select a 
name and start either an encrypted or unencrypted to 
that person.  The user is also allowed to refresh the 
contact list to retrieve the current data.  The call 
arbitrary IP address menu allows the user to type in the 
IP address of someone they wish to call that is not 
registered on the contact list.  The system menu allows 
the user to view their network information, signal 
strength, and log out of the authentication system and 
device. 
The user presents a username and password to log 
into the authentication system and device to receive 
service.  By having the authentication take place at the 
central authentication system instead of on the actual 
IMP device, any user on the system may log in from 
any IMP.  The keypad numbers are mapped to the 
letters of the alphabet using the encoding used for 
touch-tone phones.  The authentication system submits 
username and password via an SSL connection, and a 
contact list for the user is returned if the password is 
correct.  If the user is denied access to the 
authentication system, the interface is reinitialized to 
allow additional login attempts.  
The most important aspect of the user interface is 
allowing the user to call another party and talk to them 
using the SVOIP program.  Once a user selects a name 
to call, the user interface uses the data from the 
authentication system to resolve the name to an IP 
address.  This address is used to contact the remote 
party to negotiate a port to be used for the call, as well 
as whether or not the call will be encrypted. This 
connection is done using an SSL socket for security. 
The SVOIP program is then started with the negotiated 
parameters and the user is presented with the security 
information on the LCD. The user is also able to cancel 
the call via the keypad. On the receiving end, the user 
interface listens to a port that is used to exchange the 
negotiated parameters. When a connection is received, 
the user interface is interrupted and information 
indicating the type of incoming call is displayed. The 
SVOIP program is started as well, and the receiving 
user is also allowed to cancel the call via the keypad. 
When the call is completed, both users are returned to 
their original location in the navigation menu. 
The use of Linux provided the advantage of a 
familiar programming environment, which accelerated 
our enhancements. It is hard to overestimate the value 
of programmability in an end-to-end architecture! 
The voice quality is quite good. We did some 
comparisons among our mobile telephones (this turned 
out to give us a reasonable selection of providers) with 
wireless technologies including PCS, GSM and 
CDMA, and the IMP conversations were comparable 
and often better in voice quality. In similar 
comparisons with desk phones using commercial VOIP 
services, these services often sounded better than the 
IMP, but often sounded worse. The IMP’s voice 
quality was generally inferior to a POTS telephone. 
The effects of signal quality (e.g., when distance 
from the access point is too great) are to say the least, 
dramatic. The particular Blowfish mode we have used 
for the design does not require cryptographic 
resynchronization, but if such resynchronization was 
required (for example in the case where a feedback 
mode of the Blowfish cipher was used) designs are 
available for DES which we believe are easily reused 
in the Blowfish context.  
While as designers we are rather fond of the 
prototype systems, it would benefit from the size, 
weight and other interface improvements of 
commercial systems, as well as improvements in 
battery technology (although 2-3 hours of active use is 
similar to the battery life we experience using 
commercial cellular telephone systems). In spite of 
these limitations (and perhaps this is inappropriate to 
note in a technical paper, but is our experience 
nonetheless) that our colleagues are initially curious 
about the systems, and become somewhat envious of 
the Internet Mobile Phones once their function is 
understood. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
7.1. Prior and Related Work 
 
Architectural work by DeTreville and Sincoskie [2] 
described a substantial experiment with voice over 
Ethernet. In that experiment, custom handsets were 
constructed and attached to a 3Mbps Ethernet to build a 
packet-based PBX. One of the authors has experience 
with these phones, which performed remarkably well. 
This system demonstrated clearly that a packet-based 
voice telephony system could be realized and might 
have a variety of attractions. Using  the access network 
versus bearer service distinction of Section 1, this 
system can be seen as unifying the access and bearer 
service, as the IMP does in the wireless domain. The 
agenda for this research is discussed in the recent 
article by Sincoskie [26].  
Similar LAN telephony systems were implemented 
by a group at Xerox PARC [27,30], which attempted 
greater integration with a desktop workstation 
environment; other researchers used the same LAN for 
voice and data packets and like the PARC team 
attempted to merge desktop functionality with 
telephony services [15,19,20,22]. The IMP’s only role 
is to be a secure mobile phone with IP access and 
bearer services. 
 Commercial VOIP service is widely available 
(e.g., from Vonage and Net2Phone), but the service is 
largely between switches internal to the telephony 
system rather than directly between end devices. Some 
switch vendors are successfully selling VOIP phones to 
commercial customers who wish to maintain a single 
network infrastructure, letting the vendor’s switch 
interface to the telephone company, acting as a PBX.. 
Nextel uses a packet overlay on telephony-style 
channels to provide services such as a “Walkie-Talkie” 
mode and group services, but does not leverage the 
Internet in the way we have with the wireless LAN 
technology used by the IMP. 
 The ICEBERG [18,29] project at Berkeley 
builds a signaling and service infrastructure using 
advanced cluster computing technology and a novel 
access point architecture. The IAP access points are 
used to interconnect mobile devices (GSM telephones 
and 802.11 laptops are described in the papers) to the 
Internet, and provide signaling and call setup services 
to the mobile user which seem superior to H.323 and 
SIP[9] in the ICEBERG team’s analysis. Our view is 
that the ICEBERG system is a powerful service overlay 
for IP, and if one chose to use the IMP as a mobile 
device for ICEBERG, it would simply replace some of 
its present software with interface software for the IAP. 
While consideration has been given to various forms 
of Internet appliance (see, for example the useful 
framework in [6]), as well as handheld computing (e.g., 
Itsy [8] which also addresses power and packaging 
issues) we believe our secure wireless LAN-based 
mobile phone system is unique.  
The most similar mobile device functionality was 
achieved by Shih, et al. [25] using a PDA-based system 
based on the Compaq iPAQ platform, with 802.11b 
communications. They studied a novel scheme for 
power management, and added a “miniBrick” device 
interface designed to augment the 802.11 LAN. In the 
infrastructure mode of operation described in their 
paper, the device does not operate with arbitrary 
802.11 infrastructures (although it appears it could 
operate peer-to-peer), and the focus was neither  the 
programming environment nor the  security. Their goal 
was improved power management for the mobile 
device rather than a reexamination of network 
architecture implied by an IP-based mobile telephony 
infrastructure. The IMP is possibly the simplest 
possible proof-of-concept experiment for an all-IP 
mobile telephony infrastructure. 
 
7.2. Contributions 
 
The IMP can be built by a hobbyist, which we 
believe has been aided by the technical detail in 
selected portions of this paper. While the prototype 
IMP realization is clumsy relative to devices such as 
commercial mobile phones and pagers, it could be far 
more portable if commercially packaged. A desirable 
consequence of our work would be the development of 
an ad-hoc user community of IMP users; we have 
GPLed our software and contributed it back into the 
Linux mainstream, so our software efforts need not be 
duplicated.  
 
We believe the important contributions of our work 
are three: 
1. We have shown (albeit at a very small scale) that an 
Internet-based device can use a wireless LAN link 
to emulate most of the desirable properties of 
cellular telephony, while remaining IP-based. While 
it was in no way designed to interface to the 
conventional telephone system, the advent of 
telephony/VOIP gateways might create interesting 
opportunities for interoperability experiments. 
2. We have shown that in spite of using wireless LAN 
technology, strong encryption can be used over the 
IP layer to secure the channel using modern 
algorithms for cryptography and key negotiation. 
The ease with which this was accomplished should 
be embarrassing to cellular telephone vendors. 
3. We have implemented the system in a  “peer-to-
peer” fashion (with  the exception of our directory 
scheme), with the explicit goal of providing an 
interface to wireless LANs which maximizes 
Internet interoperability and minimizes the need for 
centralized administration.  
 
7.3. Future Work 
 
The Internet Mobile Phone prototypes described in 
the paper suggest that interesting ad-hoc voice 
networks could be constructed with wireless access 
points, for example those that are deployed throughout 
our organization’s facilities – some individuals and 
organizations are now permitting public access to these 
access points, albeit with some of the limitations such 
as NATS and firewalls mentioned in Section 1 While 
802.11b contention might provide a limitation on 
multiplexing, the fixed bandwidth required for voice 
encoding suggests that capacity upgrades applied 
locally, such as switching to 802.11a or 802.11g, could 
upgrade service “hot-spots” as required. For the 
devices to interface with commercial VOIP offerings, 
they would simply have to use the same voice coding; 
the security features could be selectively deployed as 
they are with the IMPs. 
Extensibility research would examine how easily 
features are added to these P2P “phones” based on an 
end-to-end architecture as compared to GPRS and 
other approaches being attempted by the telephone 
community. The straightforward addition of high-grade 
security to our system suggests an architectural 
advantage. Useful extensions to achieve greater 
Internet interoperability would include 
implementations of SIP[9] and  IPSEC [15]..   
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